The Appellate Court held that the judgment was not against manifest weight of evidence. The Appellate Court reasoned that the Department had retaliated against Wynn under Ethics Act's definition of "retaliation", which includes change in terms or conditions of employment. Further, the Ethics Act covers contract employees. Finally, as nonrenewal of a contract is an "adverse employment action" under Title VII, nonrenewal is a retaliatory action. Thus, the judgment was affirmed.
Plaintiff Wynn worked as a contract employee for the defendant (the Illinois Department of Human Services) for 13 years, and then his contract was not renewed. Wynn v. The Illinois Department of Human Services, 2017 IL App (1st) 160344 (May 23, 2017). The plaintiff sued under the whistleblower provision of State Officials and Employees Ethics Act, alleging that the Department fired him in retaliation for reporting an improper expenditure to an auditor. After a 1-day bench trial, the court found and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.
The Appellate Court held that the judgment was not against manifest weight of evidence. The Appellate Court reasoned that the Department had retaliated against Wynn under Ethics Act's definition of "retaliation", which includes change in terms or conditions of employment. Further, the Ethics Act covers contract employees. Finally, as nonrenewal of a contract is an "adverse employment action" under Title VII, nonrenewal is a retaliatory action. Thus, the judgment was affirmed.
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Congratulations to Bradley Levison for the winning appellate briefs in Williams, et al. v. Athletico, Ltd., et al., 2017 Ill. App. (1st) 161902. On March 21, 2017, the First District Appellate Court agreed with Brad’s argument. The First District held that a plaintiff was required to comply with the requirements of Illinois’ Healing Art Malpractice statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-622, where the complaint alleged negligence against a licensed athletic trainer for failing to assess and evaluate a concussion sustained by a student athletic during a high school football game. Brad served as lead author of defendants’ Rule 308 appeal in Williams. Williams is the first decision in Illinois to find that a lawsuit against a licensed athletic trainer for failing to perform his function as an athletic trainer alleges healing art malpractice and expands the application of section 2-622 of the Code. Williams confirms that healing art malpractice is not limited to merely doctors and nurses but includes those professions which treat medical ailments and injuries. In Williams, the parents of a disabled student athlete brought a lawsuit against a licensed athletic trainer and two athletic training service providers alleging that defendants were negligent for failing to assess the student athlete for symptoms of head trauma during a high school football game. The complaint alleged ordinary negligence and defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that plaintiffs failed to attach a certificate from a health care professional as required by section 2-622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss but certified three questions which the First District Appellate Court agreed to consider. The First District summarized that “as presented in both question one and question two, the core question of law to be answered is whether the alleged negligent conduct concerns the area of healing art malpractice and whether compliance with section 2-622 of the Code is required.” Williams, 2017 Ill. App. (1st) 161902 at ¶11. The First District answered the first and second questions in the affirmative holding that “plaintiffs were required to attach an affidavit and health professional’s report pursuant to section 2-622 of the Code, where the complaint alleges negligent conduct by a licensed athletic trainer hired to provide on-site injury evaluation and treatment to participants of an athletic competition for failing to assess and evaluate an athlete for a concussion and for failing to recognize signs of a concussion following head trauma sustained by a participant in the athletic competition.” Williams, 2017 Ill. App. (1st) 161902 at ¶31. Plaintiff sued his former employer for breaching his employment contract by failing to pay him severance benefits. Rosenberger v. United Community Bancshares, Inc., 2017 Ill. App. (1st) 161102 (February 24, 2017). The Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the employer. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded. The Appellate Court held that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the employer's "performance under section 4(e) of the Employment Agreement was excused under the doctrine of legal impossibility." The Court noted that the employer presented no evidence "demonstrating that it applied for an exception to make the severance payment". Thus, the Circuit Court erred "in granting summary judgment in UCB's favor on grounds that its performance under the Employment Agreement was rendered objectively impossible by operation of law." Further, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's conduct was cause for his employer to terminate him. Thus, the matter was remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff hired the defendant to deliver two cargo loads to a customer, which the defendant picked up and refused to deliver, in an attempt to force the plaintiff to pay the defendant funds that the plaintiff allegedly owed the defendant. Bullet Express, Inc. v. New Way Logistics, Inc., 2016 Ill. App. (1st) 160651 (December 30, 2016). The plaintiff sued for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage. After a bench trial, the court found that the defendant was liable to plaintiff, and awarded $45,141 in lost profits, plus punitive damages. The court held that there was ample evidence in the record to support an inference that it was the defendant's conduct that caused a customer to cease doing business with the plaintiff. The Appellate Court held there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court awarding $22,000 in punitive damages on tortious interference count. Plaintiff, the former executive director of City's office of compliance, resigned from his position, and later sued the City for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, which the trial court dismissed. Boswell v. City of Chicago, 2016 Ill. App. (1st) 150871 (December 20, 2016). The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the City formed a contract with the Plaintiff through the municipal ordinance creating the executive director position. Thus, the City promised the Plaintiff employment under certain conditions and he reasonably relied on that promise to his detriment. Further, his promissory estoppel claim was alleged with enough specificity to state a claim. Plaintiff, a Caucasian of a non-Pentecostal religion, sued her former employer for race and religion discrimination in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"). Schnitker v. Springfield Urban League, Inc., 2016 Ill. App. (4th) 150991 (November 22, 2016). She claimed that her employer failed to rehire her for a teaching position after illegally discriminating against her based on her race and religion. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $100,000. The employer appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by tendering three of the Plainitff's proposed jury instructions to the jury relating to the IHRA. The IHRA requires Plaintiff to show a link between her race or religion and defendant's decision not to rehire her when asserting the basis for termination was pretextual. The Appellate Court held that nothing in record showed that the plaintiff presented direct evidence of discrimination. The jury instructions inaccurately conveyed the law, as instructions failed to identify that the jury had to determine whether the defendant failed to rehire the plaintiff because of her race or religion. Thus, the court erred in giving the instruction that the defendant's reason for termination was based on mixed motive, as the plaintiff failed to present evidence of mixed motive. The plaintiff, a former employee, sued his former employer for breaching their employment contract. Reed v. Getco, LLC, 151801 (1st Dist. September 30, 2016). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of and awarded $1 million to Plaintiff. The Appellate Court affirmed and held that the trial court properly found that: (1) The defendant did not properly waive the non-compete provision in the employment agreement, because provision in contract prohibited any waiver or modification that was not in writing and signed by the party to be charged, which it failed to do; and (2) The plaintiff did not have a duty to mitigate damages. The Court reasoned that a breach of any provision of the employment agreement was not a condition precedent to the defendant's obligation to pay the plaintiff, as parties negotiated and agreed that the plaintiff would be paid a sum if and when he left the defendant's employ, and that the plaintiff would not engage in competitive activity during his employment with Defendant and for 6 months after his departure. Plaintiff Ohle was denied a job at a Neiman Marcus store because she failed a credit check, and she filed suit under the Illinois Employee Credit Privacy Act. Ohle v. Neiman Marcus Group, 141994 (1st Dist. September 27, 2016). The Circuit Court held that sales associate position fell within the "access" provision of the Act. However, the Appellate Court reversed, holding that sales associates are neither managers nor select few employees entrusted with personal and confidential information of customers. Further, the Defendant did not meet its burden of proof to show that the exemption to the Act applies to a sales associate position. Therefore, its admitted discrimination against the Plaintiff based on her low credit score was not permitted under the Act. Plaintiff brought retaliatory discharge suit, alleging that he was fired by his employer in retaliation for engaging in activity protected by Volunteer Emergency Worker Job Protection Act. Seeman v. Wes Kochel, Inc., 2016 Ill. App. 3d 150640 (September 19, 2016). The plaintiff was fired for being tardy, when he arrived at work late after having responded to fire call as a volunteer firefighter for local fire protection district. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Appellate Court affirmed. The record showed that the plaintiff received more than $240 in monetary compensation from fire protection district, in each of his 5 years, so he was not statutorily protected from retaliatory discharge by Section 5 of Volunteer Act. Therefore, the Circuit Court properly dismissed Count II of Plaintiff's complaint, because specific form of retaliatory discharge alleged sounds in the Volunteer Act and not the common law. In 2006, Murillo began working with a contractor as a janitor at a Chicago police station. Murillo v. City of Chicago, 143002 (1st Dist. August 2, 2016). Three years later, the police station decided that Murillo could no longer work there because people had learned that Murillo had been arrested in 1999, even though the charge was dismissed for lack of probable cause. Murillo sued for discrimination under the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2-103(A), (IHRA), which forbids employers from “[using] the fact of an arrest” as a basis to discriminate in employment. The Circuit Court found that Plaintiff's termination violated Illinois law. The Appellate Court affirmed that finding, holding that employers may not terminate employees based solely on the fact that the person was arrested for particular conduct. However, the Appellate Court did note that an employer may terminate an employer for prior conduct where there is information that indicates the person actually engaged in the conduct. The Appellate Court also held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to arbitrarily reduce Murillo's attorney's costs and rates without any explanation or clear rationale. Thus, the Appellate Court remanded the mater to the trial court to: (1) reexamine its reductions of time spent by Murillo's attorneys on the case and give reasons for any reductions; (2) adjust the fee calculations in light of the attorney hourly rates; and (3) determine additional fees (and costs) for defending the appeal and the City’s 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 petition. |
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