A school principal brought a Title VII action against her employer alleging that defendant's opting out of the third-year of her contract was motivated by her race and was in retaliation for making complaints of race discrimination. Ferrill v. Oak Creek-Franklin Joint School Dist., No. 15-3805 (7th Cir., June 19, 2017). The school moved for summary judgment and the District Court granted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The defendant explained that the plaintiff was fired for poor job performance, and record showed that the plaintiff was not performing her job according to the defendant's legitimate expectations, where: (1) the defendant had received numerous complaints about the plaintiff's confrontational management style; (2) the complaints had been confirmed by an independent consulting firm, which ultimately recommended that the plaintiff be fired; and (3) the plaintiff had resisted the defendant's efforts to improve her job performance. The fact that the plaintiff's year-end evaluation indicated satisfactory performance in certain areas or that the plaintiff received the district-wide 3 percent cost of living raise did not require different result.

Employee sued for retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for being fired the day she returned to work from FMLA leave. Tibbs v. Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, No. 16-1671 (7th Cir. June 19, 2017). The defendant moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The District court held that the defendant never employed the plaintiff and thus could not have fired her, and that in any event, there is no evidence of retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could not point to evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that any of her supervisors harbored retaliatory animus against her. Thus, the court did not resolve the question whether the defendant employed the plaintiff.
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More specifically, the defendant explained that the plaintiff had been fired because of workplace misconduct, and the record showed that, prior to taking FMLA leave, the plaintiff had been accused of insubordination. Moreover, the record showed that the plaintiff had ignored a scheduled meeting with her supervisor to discuss the allegations of misconduct and did not otherwise address said allegations of misconduct against her. Also, while timing of plaintiff's termination was suspicious, the plaintiff failed to present evidence to show that accusation of poor job performance was baseless.

Plaintiff Wynn worked as a contract employee for the defendant (the Illinois Department of Human Services) for 13 years, and then his contract was not renewed. Wynn v. The Illinois Department of Human Services, 2017 IL App (1st) 160344 (May 23, 2017). The plaintiff sued under the whistleblower provision of State Officials and Employees Ethics Act, alleging that the Department fired him in retaliation for reporting an improper expenditure to an auditor. After a 1-day bench trial, the court found and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.

The Appellate Court held that the judgment was not against manifest weight of evidence. The Appellate Court reasoned that the Department had retaliated against Wynn under Ethics Act's definition of "retaliation", which includes change in terms or conditions of employment. Further, the Ethics Act covers contract employees. Finally, as nonrenewal of a contract is an "adverse employment action" under Title VII, nonrenewal is a retaliatory action. Thus, the judgment was affirmed.

Union employee sued his employer for failing to pay him for his final two weeks of work in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Vega v. New Forest Home Cemetery, LLC, No. 16-3119 (7th Cir., May 15, 2017). The employer moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded.

The District Court found that the employee had failed to exhaust the grievance procedure outlined in collective bargaining agreement prior to filing the lawsuit. However, the Seventh Circuit held that while the grievance the procedure in the collective bargaining agreement covered pay disputes, it did not waive plaintiff's FSLA statutory rights.

Furthermore, although the collective barganing agreement to arbitration provision is enforceable, the agreement must resolve the employee's statutory and contractual rights through the grievance procedure delineated in the agreement. Therefore, the employee was free to file this lawsuit in court regardless of whether he had filed any grievance, since the collective bargaining agreement did not clearly and unmistakenly require him to use grievance procedure set forth to resolve his FSLA claim.

An Assistant Principal sued her employer under the Americans with Disability Act, alleging that the defendant fired her because of her knee disability and failed to accommodate her by placing her in a new position. Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, No. 16-1971 (May 4, 2017). The defendant moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The Seventh Circuit held that the record showed that the plaintiff could not be in vicinity of "potentially unruly students," and that defendant fired her after her medical leave benefits ran out when she failed to return to work. Further, the record showed that the plaintiff could not return to her job or  all but one of the suggested potential jobs because she would be in proximity to "potentially unruly students", which would have violated her medical restriction. While there was one remaining potential job did not involve proximity to unruly students, the defendant did not violate ADA by failing to place her into that job, as that job would have been a promotion and she was not otherwise most qualified candidate for that position. Finally, the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that the positions could have been modified to avoid student contact.

Hirmiz, a front desk clerk, sued his employer, a hotel, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that his employer had failed to accommodate his disability (sensitivity to electromagnetic voltage), discriminated against him because of it, and fired him in retaliation for having complained about the hotel's voltage to OSHA. Hirmiz v. New Harrison Hotel Corp., No. 15 C 6874 (7th Cir. April 6, 2017). The hotel fired Hirmiz after he was caught on video sleeping in the hotel lobby while a fight broke out among several guests.

The hotel moved for summary judgement, which the District Court granted. The District Court held that Hirmiz had failed to present evidence that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, that he had engaged in any protected activity before his termination, or that the complaint he’d filed with OSHA had played any role in his termination.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It noted that there is debate in the medical community over whether sensitivity to electromagnetic voltage is a physical disorder or a psychological one. Regardless, Hirmiz had provided no evidence—medical or otherwise—that he suffers from any “impairment” that “substantially limits” any of his “major life activities,” as required under the ADA. Furthermore, he did not prove that he fits either of the other definitions of “disability” in the ADA - i.e. a “record” of such an impairment or that he was “regarded as having” one by his employer..
Further, Hirmiz did not engage in any protected activity as he did not seek an accommodation or complain of discrimination (until after he was fired). Nor had he shown any causal link between his OSHA complaint and his termination. Finally , the hotel had provided valid reasons for firing Hirmiz.
Hirmiz tried to give us new evidence regarding his medical condition however, new evidence may not be presented on appeal.

The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that sexual orientation discrimination in employment is a subset of sex discrimination, and thus barred by Title VII. Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll. of Indiana, No. 15-1720, (7th Cir. April 4, 2017). 

The court revived the complaint of plaintiff Kimberly Hively in which she alleged that she was fired from a part-time job and not hired for multiple full-time positions because she is a lesbian. The majority opinion, written by Judge Diane Wood, reasoned that if all facts were the same but her sex—that is, if plaintiff had been a man married to a woman—she would have been hired, and thus had suffered “paradigmatic sex discrimination.” Hively at *5. The court also held that sexual orientation discrimination “represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype”. Id.  (Dissent filed).

Plaintiff sued alleging that defendants were negligent in hiring an employee's supervisor, who had verbally abused employee, made sexual advances towards her at workplace, threatened her with loss of her job if she did not accompany him on personal out-of-town trip, and then killed and raped her on that trip. Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., No. 16-1693 (7th Cir. March 24, 2017). The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded.

The District Court had held that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the employee for her supervisor's criminal acts. However, the Seventh Circuit held that there was a triable issue as to whether it was foreseeable that the supervisor would harm the employee given his prior pattern of conduct against her. Neither the fact that the supervisor committed the intentional tort outside scope of employment nor that he had never harmed or made explicit threat the to the employee prior to the trip required a different result.

Professor brought Title VII and IX claims, alleging that she was retaliated against after forwarding a student complaint of sexual harassment and after filing an EEOC complaint. ​Burton v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, No. 16-2982 (7th Cir. March 17, 2017). The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The Seventh Circuit held that staff criticism and failure to support her curriculum initiative were not sufficiently material to be adverse. While the "letter of direction" and letter requesting formal reprimand were materially adverse acts, the plaintiff failed to show that either act was linked to her filing of EEOC charge.