The Seventh Circuit held that the record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support NLRB's determination that Columbia had violated NLRA, where language in the collective bargaining agreement gave Columbia the sole discretion to modify courses within its curriculum. Further, the NLRB erred in awarding the union bargaining expenses during its efforts to have Columbia bargain over reduction in credit hours, although on remand NLRB could grant certain expenses based on its unchallenged finding that Columbia had failed to bargain in good faith.
The Part-Time Faculty Association filed a charge against Columbia College Chicago at the NLRB alleging that Columbia had violated NLRA by failing to bargain with the union over the effects of Columbia's decision to reduce credit-hours for classes assigned to union members. Columbia College of Chicago v. N.L.R.B., Nos. 16-2026 & 16-2080 Cons. (February 2, 2017). The NLRB determined that Columbia had violated NLRA. Columbia petitioned for review. The Seventh Circuit granted the petition, and granted in part and denied in part the NLRB’s application for enforcement. Thus, the Seventh Circuit enforced in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
The Seventh Circuit held that the record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support NLRB's determination that Columbia had violated NLRA, where language in the collective bargaining agreement gave Columbia the sole discretion to modify courses within its curriculum. Further, the NLRB erred in awarding the union bargaining expenses during its efforts to have Columbia bargain over reduction in credit hours, although on remand NLRB could grant certain expenses based on its unchallenged finding that Columbia had failed to bargain in good faith.
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Plaintiff sued under the ADEA, Title VII and Equal Pay Act, alleging that she was denied a pay increase and title change because of her race, gender and age in the year prior to her announced retirement. David v. Bd. of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508, No. 15-2132 (7th Cir. January 13, 2017). The employer moved for summary judgement and the District Court granted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that while the plaintiff claimed that younger, non-African-American co-workers were paid more for equivalent work, she failed to show that the co-workers was similarly-situated as the co-workers performed different additional duties and, unlike the plaintiff, they had college degrees and performed tasks that required their college degree. The Seventh Circuit also rejected plaintiff's discrimination claim based on the defendant's delay in processing her request for new job title and more pay arising out of her assumption of new duties, because: (1) the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the process for changing her title could have been accomplished prior to her announced retirement date; and (2) the plaintiff failed to present evidence to refute the defendant's claim that her assumption of additional duties constituted only a lateral change in jobs. Finally, the fact that the decision-maker made a comment regarding the plaintiff's impending retirement date did not constitute evidence of age discrimination, since: (1) comments about retirement eligibility are not necessarily age-based; and (2) decision-maker was merely commenting on plaintiff's previously announced status as "short-timer." Plaintiffs claimed that their former employer's refusal to pay plaintiffs pro rata vacation pay upon their termination violated Ill. Wage Payment and Collection Act, and moved for class certification. McCaster v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., No. 15-3258 (7th Cir. January 5, 2017). The District Court denied certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs' proposed class definition, "all persons separated from hourly employment...who were subject to [defendant's] vacation policy and who did not receive all earned vacation pay" described an improper class, as: (1) a person who qualified as member of plaintiffs' class depended on whether said person had valid claim; and (2) such a "fail safe" class is impermissible because a class member either wins a case or, by virtue of losing case, is defined out of the class and would not be bound by the District Court's judgment. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' alternative definition, which removed the reference to the class member's failure to receive vacation pay, did not satisfy class action requirements under Rule 23, since plaintiffs failed to identify any unlawful conduct on defendant's part that was common to the entire proposed class and had caused all of the class members to suffer the same injury. The Illinois legislature clarified employees' right to privacy pertaining to their personal online accounts in the Illinois Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act. 820 ILCS 55 et seq. With some restrictions, the changes do not limit an employer's right to monitor an employee's use of its email accounts and electronic devices. The Act already prevented employers from requesting employees' and applicants' social media passwords on networking websites. The Act now extends employees' and applicants' privacy protection beyond passwords to usernames and personal online accounts, and adds retaliation provisions. The Act now prohibits employers from:
In the event of inadvertent disclosures, an employer is not liable for having this information, unless the employer uses the information or enables a third party to use the information. The Victim's Economic Security and Safety Act ("VESSA") requires that employers provide unpaid leave to employees who are victims of domestic or sexual abuse. Effective January 1, 2017, even employers with only one employee are subject to VESSA. Now, employers with 1-14 employees must allow employees covered by VESSA up to four weeks of unpaid leave to handle VESSA issues. Employers with 15-49 employees must allow eight weeks of leave. Employers with 50 or more employees must allow 12 weeks of leave. Plaintiff hired the defendant to deliver two cargo loads to a customer, which the defendant picked up and refused to deliver, in an attempt to force the plaintiff to pay the defendant funds that the plaintiff allegedly owed the defendant. Bullet Express, Inc. v. New Way Logistics, Inc., 2016 Ill. App. (1st) 160651 (December 30, 2016). The plaintiff sued for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage. After a bench trial, the court found that the defendant was liable to plaintiff, and awarded $45,141 in lost profits, plus punitive damages. The court held that there was ample evidence in the record to support an inference that it was the defendant's conduct that caused a customer to cease doing business with the plaintiff. The Appellate Court held there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court awarding $22,000 in punitive damages on tortious interference count. Plaintiff sued his employer, alleging that it breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating its bonus plan prior to the time when the plan was required to end due to a new governmental regulation that prohibited the defendant from giving those bonuses to the plaintiff and his co-workers based on their ability to recruit and retain students to defendant's school. Wilson v. Career Education Corp., No. 16-1063 (7th Cir. December 22, 2016). The District Court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that the terms of the bonus plan allowed the defendant to change terms of plan at any time. Moreover, while the governmental regulation was not scheduled to take place for another five months, the plaintiff could not reasonably expect that bonuses would not be terminated prior to effective date of regulation, and the actual motivation for termination of bonus plan, i.e., financial downturn in business, cannot be characterized as being in bad faith or beyond objectively reasonable expectations. Plaintiff, the former executive director of City's office of compliance, resigned from his position, and later sued the City for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, which the trial court dismissed. Boswell v. City of Chicago, 2016 Ill. App. (1st) 150871 (December 20, 2016). The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the City formed a contract with the Plaintiff through the municipal ordinance creating the executive director position. Thus, the City promised the Plaintiff employment under certain conditions and he reasonably relied on that promise to his detriment. Further, his promissory estoppel claim was alleged with enough specificity to state a claim. |
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