ILCS 5/14-2, is unconstitutional because it is overly broad.
In Clark, the defendant recorded: (a) courtroom conversations involving himself, his attorney, and the judge; and (b) a hallway conversation with opposing counsel, without consent from any of the individuals. He was charged under the Illinois eavesdropping statute. He filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the section violated his First Amendment rights and his right to substantive due process. The Circuit Court agreed. The State appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Illinois Supreme Court started by noting that the eavesdropping statute was amended in 1994 to prohibit the recording of any conversation unless all parties consented, even if there were no expectation of privacy. The Court held that because the statute criminalizes the recording of a whole range of conversations that could not be deemed to be private, and because the statute covers a broad array of wholly innocent conduct, it is overly broad.
In Melongo, the opinion stated that the Court's analysis was guided by Clark. Again, the statute was not found to serve any legitimate interest in protecting conversational privacy. Therefore, the Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face.