The Appellate Court held that the judgment was not against manifest weight of evidence. The Appellate Court reasoned that the Department had retaliated against Wynn under Ethics Act's definition of "retaliation", which includes change in terms or conditions of employment. Further, the Ethics Act covers contract employees. Finally, as nonrenewal of a contract is an "adverse employment action" under Title VII, nonrenewal is a retaliatory action. Thus, the judgment was affirmed.
Plaintiff Wynn worked as a contract employee for the defendant (the Illinois Department of Human Services) for 13 years, and then his contract was not renewed. Wynn v. The Illinois Department of Human Services, 2017 IL App (1st) 160344 (May 23, 2017). The plaintiff sued under the whistleblower provision of State Officials and Employees Ethics Act, alleging that the Department fired him in retaliation for reporting an improper expenditure to an auditor. After a 1-day bench trial, the court found and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.
The Appellate Court held that the judgment was not against manifest weight of evidence. The Appellate Court reasoned that the Department had retaliated against Wynn under Ethics Act's definition of "retaliation", which includes change in terms or conditions of employment. Further, the Ethics Act covers contract employees. Finally, as nonrenewal of a contract is an "adverse employment action" under Title VII, nonrenewal is a retaliatory action. Thus, the judgment was affirmed.
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Hirmiz, a front desk clerk, sued his employer, a hotel, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that his employer had failed to accommodate his disability (sensitivity to electromagnetic voltage), discriminated against him because of it, and fired him in retaliation for having complained about the hotel's voltage to OSHA. Hirmiz v. New Harrison Hotel Corp., No. 15 C 6874 (7th Cir. April 6, 2017). The hotel fired Hirmiz after he was caught on video sleeping in the hotel lobby while a fight broke out among several guests. The hotel moved for summary judgement, which the District Court granted. The District Court held that Hirmiz had failed to present evidence that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, that he had engaged in any protected activity before his termination, or that the complaint he’d filed with OSHA had played any role in his termination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It noted that there is debate in the medical community over whether sensitivity to electromagnetic voltage is a physical disorder or a psychological one. Regardless, Hirmiz had provided no evidence—medical or otherwise—that he suffers from any “impairment” that “substantially limits” any of his “major life activities,” as required under the ADA. Furthermore, he did not prove that he fits either of the other definitions of “disability” in the ADA - i.e. a “record” of such an impairment or that he was “regarded as having” one by his employer.. Further, Hirmiz did not engage in any protected activity as he did not seek an accommodation or complain of discrimination (until after he was fired). Nor had he shown any causal link between his OSHA complaint and his termination. Finally , the hotel had provided valid reasons for firing Hirmiz. Hirmiz tried to give us new evidence regarding his medical condition however, new evidence may not be presented on appeal. Professor brought Title VII and IX claims, alleging that she was retaliated against after forwarding a student complaint of sexual harassment and after filing an EEOC complaint. Burton v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, No. 16-2982 (7th Cir. March 17, 2017). The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that staff criticism and failure to support her curriculum initiative were not sufficiently material to be adverse. While the "letter of direction" and letter requesting formal reprimand were materially adverse acts, the plaintiff failed to show that either act was linked to her filing of EEOC charge. Employe sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that his employer fired him because of his sensitivity to electromagnetic voltage and in retaliation for complaining about alleged high levels of voltage in his workplace. Hirmiz v. New Harrison Hotel Corp., No. 16-3915 (April 6, 2017). The employer moved for summary judgement, which the District Court granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Seventh Circuit held that the District Court could properly have found that defendant's disorder was not qualified disability under ADA as impairment that substantially limited any of plaintiff's major life activities. Further, the plaintiff had failed to establish that he had engaged in any protected conduct to establish a retaliation claim as he had not sought accommodation nor filed EEOC charge prior to his termination. Finally, the employee's new evidence about his medical condition submitted to Seventh Circuit was untimely. Professor brought Title VII and IX claims, alleging that she was retaliated against after forwarding a student complaint of sexual harassment and after filing an EEOC complaint. Burton v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin System, No. 16-2982 (7th Cir. March 17, 2017). The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that staff criticism and failure to support her curriculum initiative were not sufficiently material to be adverse. While the "letter of direction" and letter seeking formal reprimand were materially adverse acts, the plaintiff failed to show that either act was linked to her filing of EEOC charge as the letters were issued six months after the EEOC charge. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to present evidence that contested accuracy of allegations against her in either letter. Not only that, but the defendant also treated the plaintiff positively during the relevant time period by granting her tenure and seeking an upward salary adjustment. Employee brought a Section 1983 action alleging that his employer (1) improperly disciplined him for an alcohol-related incident resulting in his resignation and (2) that the discipline was in retaliation for his reports of misconduct by his fellow officers. Roake v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, No. 16-2976 (Seventh Circuit February 17, 2017). The District Court dismissed the employer's claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. As to the first claim, the employee claimed that his employer violated 14th Amendment because its conduct sullied his reputation. However, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal because the employee failed to allege that his employer did anything to alter his legal status - instead the employee resigned. As to the second claim, the Seventh Circuit held that under Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410, the employee's speech reporting his co-workers' misconduct was not protected under the First Amendment, because the employee was not speaking as "private citizen," but as "employee" fulfilling his official job duties in reporting the matter. Plaintiff-employee brought a Title VII action alleging that the defendant-employer fired her in retaliation for having reported that her supervisor had sexually harassed her. Gracia v. Sigmatron International, Inc., No. 15-3311 (7th Cir. November 29, 2016). After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for her retaliation claim. Defendant appealed the judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that the record contained sufficient evidence to support jury's verdict. While the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was fired because she had failed to correct a production error on customer's order, the jury could believe the plaintiff's denial regarding alleged incident, as well as the disavowal of the incident by a co-worker, who, according to defendant, had initially reported the incident. Moreover, the plaintiff otherwise established a causal link between her report of sexual harassment and her termination 6 weeks later, especially where evidence indicated that defendant had tolerated similar errors made by co-workers who had not protested sexual harassment. Further, the record supported the jury's award of $50,000 in compensatory damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages, even though plaintiff merely stated that her termination was "hard" on her, and that she was depressed because she had always been used to working. The punitive damages were not excessive given defendant's efforts to hide the retaliatory discharge by generating a false paper trail that included manufactured details regarding plaintiff's job performance. Plaintiffs sued under Title VII for retaliation, allgeting that Kurtz failed to hire them due to their accusations of sexual harassment/sex discrimination against their former employer through the EEOC and lawsuit. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Services, Inc., No. 15-3572 (7th Cir. October 19, 2016). Kurtz hired all of plaintiffs' co-workers to perform the same work, but not plaintiffs. The District Court held that the plaintiffs could not state viable retaliation case where they did not formally apply. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh Circuit held that the failure to apply for work did not preclude the retaliation claim, because: (1) the adverse act concerned the defendant's, as well as the former employer's, failure to inform the plaintiffs of job openings when they informed all of the plaintiffs' co-workers about those openings and none of the plaintiffs' co-workers had engaged in any protected conduct; and (2) plaintiffs' failure to apply for the work stemmed from very discriminatory practice that they had complained about. Plaintif brought Title VII and contract claims alleging that her employer fired her because of her race and in retaliation for having complained of racial harassment and in violation of an oral contract allowing her to return to work from medical leave at certain date. Williams v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook County, Illinois, Nos. 15-2325 & 15-2554 Cons. (7th Cir. October 11, 2016). The employer claimed that the plaintiff was fired for failing to return to work by deadline set by the employer. The employer moved for summary judgement, which the District Court granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish any race discrimination claim, where her comparable co-worker (who was given several opportunities to return to work after leave) was not similarly situated, as the co-worker kept in contact with the employer during her leave, while plaintiff did not, thereby giving defendant perception that she had abandoned her job. Further, plaintiff failed to establish retaliation, because her complaint was three years prior to her termination. Finally, with regard to the breach of contract claim, plaintiff alleged that her deadline to return was extended by an agreement with defendant's counsel. However, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to show that counsel had authority to extend the deadline. Employee brought suit under Title VII, alleging that his male co-worker sexually harassed him, and that his employer fired him in retaliation for complaining about the sexual harassment. Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., No. 13-3788 (7th Cir. October 5, 2016). The employer moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
As to the sexual harassment, the Seventh Circuit held that while the employee alleged that the harassment took the form of a joke with sexual connotation and four incidents of physical contact - three on his buttocks and one between his legs, he failed to show that he was harassed "because of his sex". The Seventh Circuit reasoned that there was no suggestion that the harasser was homosexual, and the physical contacts were not so patently indicative of sexual arousal that trier-of-fact could reasonably conclude that harassment was because of the plaintiff's sex. Sexual overtones to the conduct is not enough, like sexual horseplay instead of sexual discrimination. As to the retaliation, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff also failed to establish viable retaliation claim, even though termination came within two days of his complaint about co-worker's conduct, as: (1) the complaint did not concern the type of conduct that Title VII prohibits because it did not entail motive that Title VII prohibited, and thus any belief by plaintiff that he was making sexual harassment complaint was objectively unreasonable; and (2) the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant's reasons for plaintiff's termination, i.e., failure to timely report harassment and insubordination, did not occur or that defendant did not honestly believe that plaintiff had committed said infractions. Judge Rovner filed a dissent as to the retaliation claim. |
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