On April 30, 2013, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion in Smiley v. Columbia College Chicago, No. 10-3747.
The Seventh Circuit held that the District Court did not err in granting Columbia College's motion for summary judgment in employee’s Title VII action alleging that she was terminated from her part-time instructor position because of her race and/or national origin.
Columbia College investigated a complaint received from one of her students alleging that Smiley had isolated and singled him out for being Jewish. The record showed that Columbia College made termination decision after interviewing the student and Smiley, during which Smiley acknowledged that her teaching style involved goofing around with her students and teasing them. Therefore, Columbia College could properly conclude that Smilely's termination was warranted based upon expectation that its instructors would teach classes in professional manner.
The Seventh Circuit rejected Smiley's claim that Columbia College's investigation into the student complaint was deficient because it failed to interview other students in her class, where record showed that Columbia College's other investigations occurred in similar manner.
Further, Columbia College's procedures did not require it to contact other witnesses to alleged discriminatory conduct, and the school’s investigation of the complaint does not indicate that its reason for telling her it would not ask her to teach more classes was pretextual.
 On March 8, 2013, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion in an employment discrimination case, Collins v. American Red Cross, No. 11-3345.
The Seventh Circuit held that the District Court did not err in granting the Red Cross's motion for summary judgment. In the underlying action, Collins asserted that the Red Cross fired her because of her race and in retaliation for filing an EEOC claim alleging racial discrimination, in violation of Title VII.
The record showed that several of Collins's co-workers had complained of Collins's misconduct in workplace, and that Collins was fired after a management investigation substantiated those complaints. While Collins (1) denied all the accusations against her, (2) asserted that management’s investigation was “sloppy,” and (3) claimed that management could have come to wrong conclusion, those assertions did not require a different result because management’s conclusions were not facially incredible, and where Collins failed to present evidence that decision-makers held any discriminatory animosity.
Recently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a ruling that protects a transgendered employees.In Mia Macy v. Eric Holder (No. ATF-2011-0075), the EEOC held that intentional discrimination against an employee because that individual is transgender is, “by definition, discrimination based on sex” and therefore in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In December of 2010, Mia Macy applied for a vacant position with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Ms. Macy, who was then still presenting as a man, was particularly qualified for the vacancy and was told that the position was hers assuming there were no problems with her background check.
About two months later, Ms. Macy informed the Bureau via email that she was in the process of transitioning from male to female. Just five days later, the Bureau informed Ms. Macy that the position was no longer available due to federal budget reductions. She later learned that this was not true and, instead, the Bureau had hired another non-transgender candidate to fill the vacancy.
Ms. Macy filed a complaint with the Bureau’s Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office alleging that she had been discriminated based on sex, gender identity, and sex stereotyping. The EEO responded that claims for gender identity discrimination could not be adjudicated before the EEO; thus, only her claims for discrimination based on her female gender and for sex-stereotyping would be investigated. However, on appeal, the EEOC held that claims of discrimination based on transgender status are viable under Title VII’s prohibitions on sex discrimination, explaining: "When an employer discriminates against someone because the person is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate treatment 'related to the sex of the victim.' See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202." The EEOC further explained "This is true regardless of whether and employer discriminations against an employee because the individual has expressed his or her gender in a non-stereotypical fashion, because the employer is uncomfortable with the fact that the person has transitioned or is in the process of transitioning from one gender to another, or because the employer simply does not like that the person is identifying as a transgender person. In each of these circumstances, the employer is making a gender-based evaluation, thus violating the Supreme Court’s admonition that 'an employer may not take gender into account in making an employment decision.' Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244."Read the full opinion here.
Yesterday, the 7th Circuit issued an opinion in King v. Acosta Sales and Marketing, Inc., No. 11-3617 (March 13, 2012), reversing, in part, the district court and remanding the case.
In the underlying action, former employee King charged her former employer Acosta with two kinds of sex discrimination: that Acosta maintained a hostile work environment in which conditions for women were inferior to those for men, and that Acosta paid women less than men for the same work.
The Seventh Circuit opined out that an employee's only burden under the Equal Pay Act is to show a difference in pay for "equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions" (§206(d)(1)). However, the district court erred by finding that the employer need only articulate that education and prior experience accounted for any pay differences between plaintiff and her male comparatives. Instead, the employer must meet the burdens of "both production and persuasion" that the difference is the result of a "factor other than sex." Judge Easterbrook pointed out that "education and experience . . . [may] explain some or even all of the difference in the starting salaries . . . . There is no reason why they should explain increases in pay while a person is employed by Acosta. Changes in salary at most firms depend on how well a person performs at work."
Recently, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded a case in favor of an employee-plantiff. Cook v. IPC International Corp., No. 11-2502 (March 8, 2012).
The Seventh Circuit held that the employee was entitled to new trial in her Title VII lawsuit. The suit alleged that her employer had discriminated against her because of her sex and terminated her in retaliation for making complaints of discrimination.
Defendant employed plaintiff as a security supervisor. After the employee complained that her supervisor, made sexually offensive remarks and favored males, her supervisor gave her negative evaluations and accused her of misconduct, including theft. Employer transferred her to a non-supervisory position at a distant location. Supervisor told her to turn in keys and empty her locker. Believing that she had been fired, she did not return.
In the underlying action, the jury rejected the employer's claim that the employee had not been terminated. However, the District Court the confused the jury by submitting improper instructions that required jury to find that plaintiff's supervisor was sole decision-maker in order to impose liability on defendant.The Seventh Circuit reversed, calling the "cat's paw" theory of liability "a dreadful muddle." The District Court, by injecting “sole decision-maker” into deliberations created confusion, as the Supervisor was not a cat’s paw; "he was the monkey."
While Illinois law already forbids an employer from basing hiring, promotion, and other employment discussions on an employee or job applicant's credit history, Chicago is considering a new law that would go further.Alderman Pawar’s bill would mirror the enacted Illinois law to restrict credit checks in employment, but goes further by allowing Chicago residents to file a formal complaint with the city Human Rights Commission if a violation of the law occurs (in addition to the private right of action in the state bill.)The Chicago bill also bans discrimination against the long-term unemployed. If passed, it would give Chicago job applicants the right to file a complaint with the Chicago Human Rights Commission as well. This law would put an end to the vicious cycle where the longer an employee is out of work, the harder it is to to find new work.
The proposed law is set for a full counsel vote later this month, on March 14, 2012. See the Committee on Human Relations February 16, 2012 summary report here.
Note: This focuses on Illinois employees working or applying for employment with private employers in Illinois. Federal employees or applicants should see EEOC regulations applicable to federal employee complaints.
The final part of this series addresses how the EEOC interacts with other agencies as. To learn which agency is best for you, what laws you have claims under, and how to best proceed with your claims, you should talk to an employment lawyer.
Other Agencies
Many states and localities have anti-discrimination laws and agencies responsible for enforcing those laws. Illinois has the Illinois Human Rights Act and the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) as well as local laws and agencies (such as the Cook County Commission on Human Rights and the Chicago Commission on Human Relations).
Through the use of "work sharing agreements," EEOC and IDHR avoid duplication of effort while protecting a charging party's under both federal and state law. If a charge is filed with the IDHR and is also covered by federal law, the IDHR "dual files" the charge with EEOC to protect federal rights. The charge usually will be retained by the lIDHR for handling. If a charge is filed with EEOC and also is covered by state law, EEOC "dual files" the charge with the IDHR, but ordinarily the EEOC retains the charge for handling.
There are many differences in the laws that apply to discrimination claims and differences in how investigations are handled at each of the agencies. To determine which agency is best for you, you should talk to an employment lawyer before you file your charge.
Note: This focuses on Illinois employees working or applying for employment with private employers in Illinois. Federal employees or applicants should see EEOC regulations applicable to federal employee complaints.
What are the Time Limits for Filing a Charge of Discrimination?
All laws enforced by EEOC, except the Equal Pay Act, require filing a charge with EEOC before a private lawsuit may be filed in court. There are strict time limits within which charges must be filed: a charge must be filed with EEOC within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation, in order to protect the charging party's rights. However, this 180-day filing deadline is extended to 300 days if the charge also is covered by a state or local anti-discrimination law. Illinois has such anti-discrimination laws, therefore, for an employee working in Illinois, that employee has 300 days to file a charge. Because it can take time to set up an appointment to file a charge, it is not usually a good idea to wait to the last minute to try to file a charge.
Note: This focuses on Illinois employees working or applying for employment with private employers in Illinois. Federal employees or applicants should see EEOC regulations applicable to federal employee complaints.
What Information Must be Provided in the Charge of Discrimination?
There are several facts an employee must provide when filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In particular, the employee (or complaining party) must provide his or her name, address, and telephone number. The employee must also provide the name, address, and telephone number of the employer that is alleged to have discriminated against the employee, and number of employees the employer has, if known. Finally, the employee must provide a short description of the event that caused the employee to believe that his or her rights were violated; and the date(s) of the alleged violation(s).
While the employee provides the information, the EEOC has intake coordinators who can gather the information from the employee during the interview (see Part II about setting up an appointment) and the coordinator can draft the charge for the employee. Again, be sure that the information the intake coordinator writes in the charge is accurate.
Note: This focuses on Illinois employees working or applying for employment with private employers in Illinois. Federal employees or applicants should see EEOC regulations applicable to federal employee complaints.
How is a Charge of Discrimination Filed?Usually you call and set up an appointment to file the charge in person. The number for the EEOC is (800) 669-4000. For those of us in the Chicagoland area, our local district office is at 500 W. Madison St., Suite 2000, Chicago, IL 60661. See the EEOC's website for more information about the district office here: http://www.eeoc.gov/field/chicago/When you set up your appointment, you may be asked to fill out an intake questionnaire and bring it with you to your appointment. That form can be found here: http://www.eeoc.gov/form/upload/Uniform-Intake-Questionnaire.pdf. That questionnaire may constitute a charge if it contains all the information required by EEOC regulations and constitutes a clear request for the agency to act. At the appointment, you will be asked various questions and the intake coordinator will create a charge for you. Be sure to check the forms and make sure that all the information is correct. Individuals who need an accommodation in order to file a charge (such as an interpreter) should inform the EEOC field office so appropriate arrangements can be made.
The next blog entry will address what sort of information the EEOC asks for when you file a charge.
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