The defendant explained that the plaintiff was fired for poor job performance, and record showed that the plaintiff was not performing her job according to the defendant's legitimate expectations, where: (1) the defendant had received numerous complaints about the plaintiff's confrontational management style; (2) the complaints had been confirmed by an independent consulting firm, which ultimately recommended that the plaintiff be fired; and (3) the plaintiff had resisted the defendant's efforts to improve her job performance. The fact that the plaintiff's year-end evaluation indicated satisfactory performance in certain areas or that the plaintiff received the district-wide 3 percent cost of living raise did not require different result.
A school principal brought a Title VII action against her employer alleging that defendant's opting out of the third-year of her contract was motivated by her race and was in retaliation for making complaints of race discrimination. Ferrill v. Oak Creek-Franklin Joint School Dist., No. 15-3805 (7th Cir., June 19, 2017). The school moved for summary judgment and the District Court granted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The defendant explained that the plaintiff was fired for poor job performance, and record showed that the plaintiff was not performing her job according to the defendant's legitimate expectations, where: (1) the defendant had received numerous complaints about the plaintiff's confrontational management style; (2) the complaints had been confirmed by an independent consulting firm, which ultimately recommended that the plaintiff be fired; and (3) the plaintiff had resisted the defendant's efforts to improve her job performance. The fact that the plaintiff's year-end evaluation indicated satisfactory performance in certain areas or that the plaintiff received the district-wide 3 percent cost of living raise did not require different result.
0 Comments
Plaintiff sued under the ADEA, Title VII and Equal Pay Act, alleging that she was denied a pay increase and title change because of her race, gender and age in the year prior to her announced retirement. David v. Bd. of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508, No. 15-2132 (7th Cir. January 13, 2017). The employer moved for summary judgement and the District Court granted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that while the plaintiff claimed that younger, non-African-American co-workers were paid more for equivalent work, she failed to show that the co-workers was similarly-situated as the co-workers performed different additional duties and, unlike the plaintiff, they had college degrees and performed tasks that required their college degree. The Seventh Circuit also rejected plaintiff's discrimination claim based on the defendant's delay in processing her request for new job title and more pay arising out of her assumption of new duties, because: (1) the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the process for changing her title could have been accomplished prior to her announced retirement date; and (2) the plaintiff failed to present evidence to refute the defendant's claim that her assumption of additional duties constituted only a lateral change in jobs. Finally, the fact that the decision-maker made a comment regarding the plaintiff's impending retirement date did not constitute evidence of age discrimination, since: (1) comments about retirement eligibility are not necessarily age-based; and (2) decision-maker was merely commenting on plaintiff's previously announced status as "short-timer." Plaintif brought Title VII and contract claims alleging that her employer fired her because of her race and in retaliation for having complained of racial harassment and in violation of an oral contract allowing her to return to work from medical leave at certain date. Williams v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook County, Illinois, Nos. 15-2325 & 15-2554 Cons. (7th Cir. October 11, 2016). The employer claimed that the plaintiff was fired for failing to return to work by deadline set by the employer. The employer moved for summary judgement, which the District Court granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish any race discrimination claim, where her comparable co-worker (who was given several opportunities to return to work after leave) was not similarly situated, as the co-worker kept in contact with the employer during her leave, while plaintiff did not, thereby giving defendant perception that she had abandoned her job. Further, plaintiff failed to establish retaliation, because her complaint was three years prior to her termination. Finally, with regard to the breach of contract claim, plaintiff alleged that her deadline to return was extended by an agreement with defendant's counsel. However, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to show that counsel had authority to extend the deadline. Unsuccessful female applicants for paramedic positions at the City's Fire Department sued under Title VII for gender discrimination, alleging that the City denied the women's applications because of their gender, where they had failed the City's physical-skills entrance examination. Ernst v. City of Chicago, Nos. 14-3783 & 15-2030 Cons. (7th Cir., September 19, 2016). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs were entitled to new trial on their Title VII, disparate treatment action. The Seventh Circuit held that the District Court gave jury an erroneous instruction that failed to address the plaintiff's allegation that the City had anti-female motivation in creating a skills test that favored male applicants. The District Court also found that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment on their disparate impact claim, where: (1) the City conceded that skills test had disparate impact on female applicants; and (2) under federal requirements for validity studies under 29 CFR section 1607.14(B)(14), the City failed to establish either that its physical-skills entrance test reflected important elements of paramedic's job performance, or that there was connection between real jobs test and job skills contained in defendant's physical skills test. Plaintiff-employee sued his former employer for discrimination based on his Mexican ethnicity in violation of Section 1981 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., No. 15-2574 (August 19, 2016). The employer moved for summary judgement, claiming that termination was based on fact that plaintiff had improperly falsified records in effort to lessen losses to his commissions by taking his name off unprofitable files. The District Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgement. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh Circuit held that the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that: (1) other brokers removed their names from unprofitable files and were not terminated; and (2) plaintiff's supervisors were hostile to Hispanics and attempted to pin losses on plaintiff in effort to force him out of his job. Importantly, the Seventh Circuit rejected "direct" and "indirect" evidence framework when analyzing employment discrimination claims and must stop separating "direct" and "indirect" evidence and proceeding as if such evidence was subject to different legal standards. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the District Court treated the "direct" and "indirect" methods as having its own elements and rules, even though the Seventh Circuit has held that the tests are just means to consider whether one fact (here, ethnicity) caused another (here, discharge) and therefore are not “elements” of any claim. The district court’s effort to shoehorn all evidence into two “methods,” and its insistence that either method be implemented by looking for a “convincing mosaic,” detracted attention from the sole question that matters: Whether a reasonable juror could conclude that Ortiz would have kept his job if he had a different ethnicity, and everything else had remained the same. In 2006, Murillo began working with a contractor as a janitor at a Chicago police station. Murillo v. City of Chicago, 143002 (1st Dist. August 2, 2016). Three years later, the police station decided that Murillo could no longer work there because people had learned that Murillo had been arrested in 1999, even though the charge was dismissed for lack of probable cause. Murillo sued for discrimination under the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2-103(A), (IHRA), which forbids employers from “[using] the fact of an arrest” as a basis to discriminate in employment. The Circuit Court found that Plaintiff's termination violated Illinois law. The Appellate Court affirmed that finding, holding that employers may not terminate employees based solely on the fact that the person was arrested for particular conduct. However, the Appellate Court did note that an employer may terminate an employer for prior conduct where there is information that indicates the person actually engaged in the conduct. The Appellate Court also held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to arbitrarily reduce Murillo's attorney's costs and rates without any explanation or clear rationale. Thus, the Appellate Court remanded the mater to the trial court to: (1) reexamine its reductions of time spent by Murillo's attorneys on the case and give reasons for any reductions; (2) adjust the fee calculations in light of the attorney hourly rates; and (3) determine additional fees (and costs) for defending the appeal and the City’s 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 petition. Employee Simpson sued her employer, alleging that it fired her from her nursing position because of her race and age in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Simpson v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., No. 15-2679 (7th Cir. June 28, 2016). The employer moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that the record showed that the Simpson had received four reprimands about her job performance relating to complaints the employer had received from patients and other medical personnel. Simpson failed to present competent evidence that a co-worker with a comparable disciplinary history received more favorable treatment. The fact that Simpson and a co-worker testified that they had personal knowledge that other nurses had received patient complaints and were still employed did not require different result since neither Simpson nor the co-worker supplied foundation in their affidavit as to basis of knowledge regarding the disciplinary history of other co-workers. Moreover, the patient complaints cited by Simpson and the co-worker were too few in number to provide fair comparison with Simpson's disciplinary history. Plaintiff sued under Section 1983, alleging that defendants denied her a promotion to drug inspector position because of her sex. McCurdy v. Fitts, No. 15-1212 (7th Cir. June 13, 2016). Defendants moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and vacated in part and remanded. The record showed that defendants had conducted a background check of plaintiff, which revealed that she had: (1) recently filed for bankruptcy and (2) a long-term relationship with a person who belonged to biker gang that had been associated with criminal activity. However, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant did not conduct such checks with male applicants. Further, the prior male individual in the job had also experienced financial difficulties and had associated with criminal associates, and was fired because he had stolen from defendants. Seventh Circuit held that employers are entitled to learn from their prior hiring errors when considering current applicants, and record showed that relevant decision-maker conducted similar background checks on male applicants. However, remand was required with respect to plaintiff's claim that she lost money during time that defendants took to conduct the background check to extent that defendants would have temporarily promoted plaintiff to position during that time, where defendants conceded that it had immediately promoted male applicants pending results of their background checks. After receiving several customer complaints about Kreczko's job performance and unprofessional behavior, Triangle fired Kreczko. Kreczko v. Triangle Package Machinery Co., 2016 Ill. App. (1st) 151762 (May 3, 2016). Four months later, Triangle hired a younger, Hispanic employee to fill Kreczko's position. Kreczko, 51, sued Triangle alleging age, disability, and racial discrimination. The employer moved to dismiss the racial discrimination claim, which the Circuit Court dismissed. The employer later moved for summary judgment with regard to the remaining claims, and the Circuit Court granted that motion as well. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that (i) Kreczko failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination because it was shown that Kreczko fell short in meeting his legitimate performance expectations, and (ii) Triangle's reason for firing Kreczko was not a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Further, Kreczko argued that the trial court should have stricken an affidavit of Triangle's president because it was based on his "knowledge, information, and belief" rather than knowledge alone. The Appellate Court held that the trial court correctly let the entire affidavit stand as being made on personal knowledge except for a single paragraph, which was stricken. Plaintiff sued her employer for violations of Title VII, alleging that she was fired because of her gender, race and national origin. Chaib v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 15-1614 (7th Cir., April 6, 2016). The employer moved for summary judgment and the District Court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Seventh Circuit held that the record showed that the employer fired the plaintiff after discovering through video surveillance that plaintiff had improperly extended her medical leave by exaggerating her alleged impairment. While the plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to series of racially offensive conduct from her co-workers, she failed to link those individuals to the decision by management to fire her based on her own misconduct. Furthermore, the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie discrimination case based on indirect method of proof, where she could not show either that her misconduct was consistent with defendant's employment expectations, or that others accused of similar misconduct received more favorable treatment. |
As a Chicago employment lawyer, the firm focus primarily on employment law. Archives
June 2017
Categories
All
|