Chief Justice Garman began her judicial career over 40 years ago in 1974 in Vermilion County. She is the 119th chief justice on the court and the second woman to hold the post of Chief Justice.
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Rita Garman was recently sworn-in as our high court's Chief Justice by former Chief Justice Thomas Kilbride.
Chief Justice Garman began her judicial career over 40 years ago in 1974 in Vermilion County. She is the 119th chief justice on the court and the second woman to hold the post of Chief Justice.
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The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) matter. DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., No. 12-3306 (October 31, 2013).
The employees alleged that the employer failed to pay them overtime for time spent at end of shift showering and changing out of uniforms and personal protective equipment used at worksite in violation of the FLSA. An employee’s activity constitutes compensable “work” under the FLSA if such activities are required by law, by the employer, or by the “nature of the work. The District Court, in error, believed that such time was not compensable since OSHA did not mandate that the employees change their clothes and shower after work. The Seventh Circuit stated "we cannot, as the district court did, draw any negative inferences from the absence of an OSHA standard requiring Waupaca foundry workers to shower and change clothes on- site." Furthermore, courts cannot ignore, as the district court did here, factual evidence and expert testimony offered by the parties to establish the compensability of an activity under the FLSA. Therefore, the "district court erred when it ignored the 'sharp dispute' in the evidence as to the health effects of chemical exposure at Waupaca’s foundries and the impact, if any, that showering and changing clothes would have on Waupaca workers and granted summary judgment in the face of such factual disputes." Therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate because: (1) FLSA’s definition of compensable work included activities that were required to be performed due to “nature of work;” and (2) the record contained triable issue of fact as to health effects of exposure to chemicals at the foundry, as well as impact that showering and changing of clothes had on plaintiffs so as to potentially make such time necessary due to nature of their work. The Seventh Circuit held that the District Court erred in granting defendant-employer's motion to dismiss employee Lavalais' race discrimination claim. Lavalais v. Village of Melrose Park, No. 13-1200 (October 24, 2013).
The race discrimination claim alleged that the Village treated similarly-situated police officers more favorably "as to policies and re-assigment" because the Village placed Sergeant Lavalais on the midnight shift indefinitely because of his race, refusing to re-assign him to another shift. The Seventh Circuit rejected the Village's argued that the race discrimination claim was untimely because it was not measured from the initial placement on midnight shift, but from the request to transfer him to different shift. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Village's argument that the transfer denial claim was not within scope of original EEOC charge. Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that Lavalais' claim alleged a sufficient material adverse act where he asserted that his placement on the midnight shift was tantamount to stripping him of his authority as sergeant on force. |
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